Epilogue The Communist Party of China and the Future of China: In Preparation for the 17th National Congress of the CPC by Yasuo Onishi
Epilogue The Communist Party of China and the
Future of China: In Preparation for the 17th
National Congress of the CPC
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
シリーズタイトル(英
)
IDE Spot Survey
シリーズ番号 26
journal or
publication title
China's New Leadership
page range [65]-71
year 2003
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00010294
Epilogue
The Communist Party of China and the 
Future of China: In Preparation for the 
17th National Congress of the CPC
The 16th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China(hereafter CPC) 
has long been anticipated as a bellwether of 
the CPC in the 21st century. This chapter 
summarizes what the Congress has achieved 
and examines the challenges facing the coun-
try's new leaders based on the analysis in the 
preceding pages. It then attempts to forecast 
how the CPC will transform itself in the run-
up to the 17th National Congress and how 
those changes will affect Japan.
6.1 Accomplishments of the 16th 
National Congress of the CPC
The 16th National Congress was of in-
terest for two primary reasons. First, to what 
extent would there be a generational chang-
ing of the leadership? And, second, what new 
directions would the Party stake out on the 
ideological and policy fronts to deal with the 
rapidly changing political and economic situ-
ation? What, then, did the Congress actually 
achieve in these regards?
6.1.1 Drastic Regeneration of 
  Leadership
As for the fi rst point, the Standard 
Members of the Political Bureau were al-
most all replaced as Jiang Zemin retired with 
the rest of the "third generation," most of 
whom are seventy-years-old and above. The 
one holdover was Hu Jintao, at 59 (as of June 
2002, in accordance with China's guidelines 
of age) a member of the "fourth generation," 
which has now taken the helm of both Party 
and government. As will be noted below, the 
succession was not without its share of prob-
lems, such as leaving Jiang Zemin with con-
siderable infl uence, but a peaceful handover 
of power on such a scale nonetheless deserves 
credit for going some way to establishing a 
regular system of succession.1 The new leader-
ship is not only younger; it is also better edu-
cated - all are university graduates - and more 
competent professionally in the sense that in-
dividuals who have made their mark in na-
tional and regional administration have been 
promoted to the top ranks. The CPC Cen-
tral Committee membership as a whole is also 
plainly younger, better educated, and more 
competent professionally than before, with 
many offi cials who have practical administra-
tive experience being appointed in the fi elds 
of Party manegement, the economy, and pol-
itics. That ensures continuity in policy imple-
mentation. A set of solid appointments has 
thus been made to deal with the increasing-
ly complex political and economic climate on 
both the domestic and international fronts 
(see Chapter 1).
However, while retiring from the CPC 
Central Committee, Jiang Zemin failed to re-
linquish his grip on the army, retaining the 
post of Chairman of the CPC Central Military 
Commission in the status of an ordinary Par-
ty member. Although Hu Jintao is as General 
Secretary nominally the Party's supreme lead-
er, in reality Jiang Zemin continues to exer-
cise ultimate control. That leaves the transfer 
of power incomplete. Five of the nine mem-
bers of the new Political Bureau are consid-
ered allies of Jiang Zemin, who will thus be 
able to be seen as building a cloister govern-
ment for some time to come (see Chapter 2).
6.1.2 New Guiding Principle and 
Incorporation of the 
Rising Classes
Turning now to the second point, the 
thought of the "Three Represents" espoused 
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by Jiang Zemin himself has been enshrined 
in the Party Constitution as a form of "impor-
tant thought." (The theory of the "three rep-
resents" asserts that the Communist Party rep-
resents the development trend of advanced 
productive forces, the orientation of China's 
advanced culture and the fundamental inter-
ests of the overwhelming majority of the Chi-
nese people.) The designation of this concept 
as a form of "thought" gives it even greater 
weight than "Deng Xiaoping Theory" - even 
if it is not prefi xed with Jiang Zemin's own 
name - thereby enhancing Jiang's prestige.2
Moreover, the existing clause describing the 
CPC as the vanguard of the Chinese working 
class has been supplemented with a further 
clause describing it also as the vanguard of 
the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. 
This revision has an important bearing on 
the Party's raison d'_tre, for it implies an ex-
pansion in the range of interests that the Par-
ty represents far beyond those of a particular 
class.
Jiang Zemin spoke as follows in his Re-
port to the Congress (Jiang Zemin's Report, 
as we will refer to it below). "Entrepreneurs 
and technical personnel employed by non-
public scientifi c and technological enterpris-
es, managerial and technical staff employed 
by overseas-funded enterprises, the self-em-
ployed, private entrepreneurs, employees in 
intermediaries, free-lance professionals and 
members of other social strata are all builders 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics." He 
continued thus. "We should admit into the 
Party advanced elements of other social strata 
who accept the Party's line and program con-
sciously and meet the qualifi cations of Party 
membership following a long period of test." 
This made plain that reforms would extend to 
the composition of the Party's membership. 
Jiang Zemin's Report gave the reason for ad-
mitting members of the rising classes to the 
Party as "in order to increase the infl uence 
and rallying force of the Party in society at 
large."
At any rate, the CPC made a clear com-
mitment to strengthen its character as Chi-
na's governing party. But it is too early to tell 
whether that will involve transforming itself 
"from a class-based party to one of catch-all" 
or "from a party of workers and peasants to 
one of capitalists" (see Chapter 2).
6.1.3 Attach weight to Continuity in 
Foreign Policy
Other than renewing the call to the Tai-
wanese authorities to engage in a wide-rang-
ing dialogue, Jiang Zemin's Report empha-
sized that China would adhere fi rmly to its 
present foreign policy. This was a welcome de-
velopment in so far as it confi rmed that for-
eign policy would remain unchanged, but it 
also clouded predictions about post-Jiang Chi-
na for two reasons. First, Hu Jintao has not yet 
assumed charge of the body that makes for-
eign policy, which Jiang Zemin has controlled 
for so long. Some observers expect Jiang to 
maintain sway over foreign policy as a whole, 
including relations with Taiwan, for some 
time to come.
Second, the external environment could 
change considerably from when Jiang was in 
charge. Jiang did not launch his own distinct 
foreign policy until after the 15th National 
Congress of the CPC in September 1997. That 
policy displayed several features: (1) While 
based on Deng Xiaoping's policy of pursuing 
omnidirectional diplomacy, creating an in-
ternational climate conducive to economic 
growth, and giving priority to three-way rela-
tions with the United States and Japan, it also 
involved (2) extensive summit diplomacy and 
(3) strengthened engagement in regional-
ism. However, as far as (1) is concerned, there 
is no practical alternative to Deng's line. And 
neither (2) nor (3) has yet faced a real test; 
hence it is unclear whether either can survive. 
Moreover, during Jiang era, China's econom-
ic growth served as a tail wind for the coun-
try's diplomacy, but there is no guarantee that 
such favorable conditions will continue (see 
Chapter 3). Grappling with the new interna-
67Epilogue  The Communist Party of China and the Future of China
tional situation should prove a major chal-
lenge for China's new leaders.
6.1.4 Legislative and Judicial Policy
In the fi eld of legislative and judicial 
policy, the 16th National Congress reasserted 
the principle unveiled at the 15th Congress 
of building a socialist constitutional state and 
took the idea one step further. This can be 
seen in Jiang Zemin's Report, which explicit-
ly identifi es the following as indicator of the 
building of "a well-off society in an all-round 
way": "Socialist democracy and the socialist le-
gal system will be further improved. The basic 
principle of ruling the country by law will be 
implemented completely. The political, eco-
nomic and cultural rights and interests of the 
people will be respected and guaranteed in 
real earnest." The Report also includes a sec-
tion entitled "Improve the socialist legal sys-
tem" in the chapter "Political Development 
and Restructuring." Thus concrete advances 
can be expected in this area.
Nonetheless, the Report also contains 
elements that could undermine the rule of 
law: for example, it lists among the "ten prin-
ciples which the Party must follow" the idea 
of "combining the rule of law with the rule of 
virtue." But what are the criteria for "virtue," 
and how are they determined? What kind 
of country is "the rule of virtue" meant to 
achieve? In the end it will be up to the leaders 
of the day to provide the answers, and the up-
shot could be a reversion to so-called "rule by 
men" (see Chapter 4). By reviving the idea of 
the "rule of virtue," which has not been heard 
in a while, Jiang Zemin has left the new lead-
ership with the diffi cult task of pursuing the 
"rule of law" and the "rule of virtue" simulta-
neously.
6.2 Challenges Facing the New 
Leadership
Most members of the Hu Jintao's lead-
ing group - the new leadership, as we shall call 
it - are expected to serve two terms for a to-
tal of ten years (through 2012). However, for 
the reasons cited in the previous section, the 
fi ve-year period until 2007 will be dominat-
ed by the transfer of power from the old rul-
ing clique under Jiang Zemin and the need to 
frame policies to deal with the tasks identifi ed 
in Jiang Zemin's Report. In the following pag-
es we examine challenges with which the new 
leadership faces.
6.2.1 Domestic Politics
With the unveiling of the concept of 
the "Three Represents" and the revision of 
the Party Constitution, the fi rst and foremost 
challenge confronting the new leadership is 
how to bring private entrepreneurs and oth-
er members of the new classes into the Party. 
No private entrepreneurs were elected to the 
Central Committee during the 16th Nation-
al Congress, but they are, it is said, making in-
roads into politics at the regional level. It will 
be interesting to see how rapidly these gains 
translate into infl uence at the center. The 
second challenge will be grappling with so-
cial problems, such as reducing the economic 
gap between regions and between city and ru-
ral area and creating new jobs for the unem-
ployed and laid-off workers. These two chal-
lenges could present the CPC with a diffi cult 
choice, for they pull in contradictory direc-
tions. Should the Party support businessmen 
who raised its head and richened - in other 
words, the economic strong? Or should it give 
priority to providing relief to the economic 
weak?
The drastic regeneration of leadership 
has prompted hopes that the new leading 
group will implement bold political reforms 
in some form or another. But considering the 
fact that all the members of the new leading 
group themselves have climbed the ladder of 
power one rung at a time inside the existing 
political edifi ce, it is no use to have excessive 
expectations. The section on political restruc-
turing in Jiang Zemin's Report states that "the 
68 China's New Leadership
key to developing socialist democracy is to 
combine the need to uphold the Party's lead-
ership and to ensure that the people are the 
masters of the country with the need to rule 
the country by law." It then avers, "We should 
never copy any models of the political system 
of the West." As long as the fundamental as-
sumption of upholding the Party's leadership 
is maintained, there appears to be little pros-
pect of China's permitting direct elections at 
the national level or bringing in a multiparty 
system on western models (see Chapter 2).
In the fi eld of legislative and judicial 
policy, the Jiang Zemin Report declares that a 
socialist judicial system must aim to "guaran-
tee fairness and justice in the whole society." 
It then goes on to identify specifi c directions 
in judicial reform, including (1) separating 
adjudicative and prosecutorial powers, (2) im-
proving judicial proceedings, and (3) sepa-
rating adjudicative and administrative func-
tions within judicial organs. But, as suggested 
by the mention of the "rule of virtue" in the 
same breath as the "rule of law," it will like-
ly still take time for respect for the law to take 
root. Even so, now that China is a member of 
the WTO, it must lose no time in establishing 
a more transparent legal system and tighten-
ing up trial procedures (see Chapter 4).
6.2.2 Economic Management and 
Structural Reforms in the 
  Economy
In the economic fi eld, plans call for 
quadrupling the year 2000 GDP by 2020, 
which makes it imperative to sustain annu-
al growth rate of 7%. That presumably means 
that reforms will need to be carried out that 
are conducive to a transition towards market 
economy and internationalization of econo-
my. As noted in Chapter 1, there appear to be 
no major bones of contention over the course 
of macroeconomic management. Although 
there are numerous factors that could damp-
en growth, 7% should still be achievable.3 
Nonetheless, plenty of thorny problems are 
lurking in specifi c fi elds. As a case in point, let 
us examine the question of reforming state-
owned enterprises.
As indicated by the 16th National Con-
gress's decision to admit private entrepre-
neurs into the Party, the CPC is no longer as 
draconian as it once was about the ownership 
of capital; hence the privatization of state-
owned enterprises looks set to pick up steam. 
However, even though the authorities were 
relying on the stock market to provide the 
cash to fund its privatization program, share 
prices plummeted in 2001 due to specula-
tion on the shares of state-owned enterprises. 
That has forced the government to suspend 
the share sales process. The only option left 
is to sell shares on an individual basis to insid-
ers like managers and employees and to pri-
vate-sector fi rms, foreign-owned companies, 
institutional investors and the like. But, con-
sidering the sheer size of China's state-owned 
enterprises as compared to the fundraising 
capacity and management resources of these 
potential private-sector buyers, the task of 
privatization is going to take time. It appears 
certain, therefore, that there will be a fairly 
prolonged transitional phase during which a 
mixed ownership structure prevails in which 
state and private capital rub shoulders (see 
Chapter 5). If, under these circumstances, 
the country manages to establish an effective 
system of corporate governance for its state-
owned enterprises and overhaul the way they 
are run, then it will have succeeded in putting 
into practice the "Three Represents." But the 
prospects for that happening are slim.
6.2.3 Foreign Policy
The fi rst challenge confronting the 
new leadership in the fi eld of foreign poli-
cy is when and how to assert control over the 
body that makes it. In specifi c terms, that in-
volves the question of appointments to the 
Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs 
(Zhongyang Waishigongzuo Lingdao Xiao-
zu). This body's current head is Jiang Zem-
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in, but he did not assume the post until June 
1998, nine years after he acceded General 
Secretary - which fact testifi es to the diffi cul-
ty of the bringing in younger blood in this 
fi eld. To complicate matters, Jiang is widely 
believed to be eager to maintain his infl uence 
over external policy (especially when it comes 
to Taiwan). So it is too early to say whether or 
not the change of generations will proceed 
smoothly on the diplomatic front.
The second challenge facing the new 
leadership is girding itself for changes on the 
international scene while remaining faith-
ful to the policies staked out during Jiang's 
rule. Jiang's foreign policy, while rooted in 
the pragmatic approach of Deng Xiaoping 
described above, was characterized by an em-
phasis on summit diplomacy and a growing 
tendency to regionalism, the latter exempli-
fi ed by China's active involvement in ASEAN 
and the launch of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. But, as noted in the previous 
section, there are doubts about whether this 
approach will remain effective (see Chapter 
3). Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks the Unit-
ed States has shown an increasing tenden-
cy to act unilaterally, and Jiang's summit visit 
to that country in October 2002 was nothing 
more than an opportunity for "face time" with 
President Bush. Meanwhile the American mil-
itary presence in central Asia could wreck 
the achievements of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization. The new leadership has to 
wrestle with these fresh problems within the 
framework of Jiang's foreign-policy appoint-
ments, and that places it in a very tight corner 
(On March 14th 2003, the Asahi Shimbun re-
ported that Hu assumed the Head of Central 
Leading Group for Foreign Affairs of CPC. 
But the author has not affi rmed this informa-
tion).
6.2.4 External Economic Policy
A year has lapsed since China joined the 
WTO, yet the biggest challenge on the exter-
nal economic front remains implementing in-
stitutional reforms as required by WTO mem-
bership. The promises that China made to 
the international community in return for ad-
mission to the WTO have a deadline, and the 
country will need to pull out all the stops to 
fulfi l them.
The second challenge is coordinating 
the "bringing in" of foreign capital and the 
"going out" of domestic capital abroad. The 
"bringing in" strategy aims to encourage mul-
tinational corporations to invest in the ag-
ricultural, manufacturing, and high-tech 
sectors by linking foreign investment to struc-
tural adjustments at home and the overhaul 
and reorganization of state-owned enterpris-
es. The "going out" strategy chimes in with 
the tendency to regionalism noted in the sec-
tion on foreign policy. China has already be-
gun talks with ASEAN on concluding a free-
trade agreement (FTA). Jiang Zemin's Report 
asserts that China must "make the best use of 
both international and domestic markets, op-
timize the allocation of resources, expand the 
space for development and accelerate reform 
and development by opening up." By clear-
ing these hurdles the new leadership can put 
itself in a position to implement domestic 
structural reforms.
6.3 Outlook for the 17th National 
Congress of the CPC
The 16th National Congress of the CPC 
accomplished a great deal. It implemented a 
drastic regeneration of central leadership. It 
also unveiled a new guiding principle, that of 
the "Three Represents," and enshrined it in 
the Party Constitution. Still, as we have seen, 
some worrying problems remain, not least of 
all with the political succession itself. In clos-
ing we examine how these problems may de-
velop in the future.
6.3.1 When Will Jiang Zemin 
  Relinquish Power?
The most serious problem is the in-
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complete transfer of power from Jiang Zem-
in to Hu Jintao. As long as Jiang remains en-
sconced as the Chairman of the CPC Central 
Military Commission, that body could choose 
to overturn the decisions of the new leader-
ship at any time. The qualifi cations for the 
Commission's chairmanship are ill defi ned 
(the holder of the post need not be a mem-
ber of the CPC Central Committee, and there 
is no age limit). This highly abnormal situa-
tion, in combination with the fact that mem-
bers of Jiang's own faction form the majority 
of the new leadership, will probably hamper 
Hu Jintao in his attempts to exercise lead-
ership.4 The problems are especially serious 
when it comes to foreign policy, which Jiang 
used to control (see Chapter 3). At the Na-
tional People's Congress in March 2003, Jiang 
held down the Chairman of the PRC Central 
Military Commission. The transfer of power 
still remain half-baked.
A further problem is that no mem-
bers of the "fi fth generation" following on 
the heels of Hu Jintao's own "fourth genera-
tion" were appointed to the new leadership 
during the Party Congress. Hu himself was 
plucked from obscurity by Deng Xiaoping 
at the 14th National Congress in 1992, when 
he was appointed a Standard Member of the 
Party's Political Bureau. Even if Hu remains 
on as China's leader for another ten years, it 
would make sense for at least one member of 
the next generation to have a seat in the new 
leadership, but that is not how things turned 
out. This adds one more source of uncertain-
ty in the lead-up to the 17th National Con-
gress.
6.3.2 Whose Political Party Does the 
Communist Party Intend to Be?
On a literal reading, the content of the 
"Three Represents" seems to imply that the 
Communist Party has laid aside its claims to 
be the vanguard of the working class and is 
trying to transform itself into something else 
entirely. It is shocking that CPC eliminate the 
clause stating "socialism will ultimately re-
place capitalism" from the Party Constitution, 
even if it is primarily intended as a sop to pri-
vate entrepreneurs (see Chapter 2). But Jiang 
Zemin's Report and the explanation of the 
amendments to the Party Constitution insist 
that the "Three Represents" are merely an ex-
tension of Marxism. Therefore, while the poli-
cy of pursuing capitalist development current-
ly being followed by the Party gets theoretical 
sanction from the "Three Represents," the all-
important question of the future remains 
wrapped in obscurity. Whose political party 
does the CPC intend to be? The thought of 
the "Three Represents" was intended to an-
swer this question but fails to do so. It will be 
interesting to see whether the new leader-
ship provides its own answer by the 17th Con-
gress.5
6.3.3 The Impact on Japan
What effect will the outcome of the 16th 
National Congress of the CPC have abroad, 
particularly on Japan? Jiang Zemin's Report 
offers few clues on the future of Chinese pol-
icy toward Japan. One thing is certain at the 
present time: the large number of outstand-
ing issues remaining to be dealt with by the 
two countries, like the unsuccessful attempt 
of several North Korean defectors to take ref-
uge at the Japanese consulate in Shenyang, 
or Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasu-
kuni Shrine. There is little likelihood of new 
policies being adopted toward Japan just be-
cause of the change in leadership. For Chi-
na as for Japan, Sino-Japanese relations take 
a back seat to those with the U.S. We will just 
have to wait and see what policies the new 
leadership hammers out vis-a-vis the U.S.
Rather, the impact on Japan will be de-
termined primarily by how the CPC trans-
forms itself as a governing party. Changes in 
the Communist Party will have a vastly greater 
effect now than ever before, all the more so 
because China has so increased its presence 
in Asia and on the global stage thanks to its 
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economic growth. While the market economy 
has developed beyond the point of no return, 
especially in the coastal regions, and a new 
economic class has gained ascendancy, Chi-
na still  remains a large developing country, 
where the inland and rural areas lag seriously 
behind. The interests of different regions and 
social classes will continue to clash sharply for 
some time to come. Jiang Zemin climbed to 
the pinnacle of power as a Party boss on the 
coast, but his successor Hu Jintao has spent 
much of his career in the inland area, and 
it is far from certain that he has the skill to 
guide the Communist Party's transformation 
while striking a balance among all these con-
fl icting interests. The fi ve years leading up to 
the 17th National Congress of the CPC could 
prove surprisingly turbulent.
(Yasuo ONISHI)
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